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Abstract
High development velocity is critical for modern cloud sys-
tems. However, rapid development and release cycles have
mostly skipped operating systems. Modifications to behavior
in Linux, the most widely used server operating system in the
cloud, must be done slowly to minimize risk of introducing
bugs, be limited in scope, or be implemented in userspace
with a potential performance penalty.
We propose Bento, a framework for high velocity develop-
ment of Linux kernel file systems. Bento is inspired by the
recent availability of type-safe, non-garbage collected lan-
guages like Rust. It interposes a thin layer between kernel
calls to the file system and file system calls back to the ker-
nel, exposing alternative interfaces to enable kernel file sys-
tems written in safe Rust. Future work will provide support
for online upgrades, userspace debugging, and composable
file systems. We evaluate Bento by using it to implement the
xv6 file system and comparing against baselines written us-
ing the kernel VFS layer and FUSE. We find that the Bento
file system achieves comparable performance to the VFS ver-
sion and much better performance than the FUSE version.
We also evaluate against ext4 on the macrobenchmarks and
find that ext4 performs between 33% and 3.2× better than
the Bento xv6 file system.
1 Introduction
High development velocity has become a widespread talis-
man for cloud software development [28]. Many popular
cloud systems roll out new software releases on a weekly or
even daily basis, to give users faster access to new features,
to gain insight into priorities for further development, and
to reduce integration costs. While this design pattern may
seem inappropriate for mission critical software, cloud ven-
dors have shown it is practical to use short release cycles for
many high reliability services, including databases [8] and
network stacks [10, 13, 22].
Rapid release cycles have largely skipped the operating
system kernel development community, however. Linux is
the most widely used server operating system for the cloud,
but new versions drop only every few months, with major
changes limited to once every few years. Of course, Linux is
open source, and so anyone is free to iterate more rapidly, at
the cost of the later pain of reintegration with the mainline
development tree.
The Linux community has adopted several approaches to
improving feature velocity, none entirely successful. One ap-
proach is to try to future-proof the kernel by adding features
before they are needed. We can see that in action with the
popular Docker container manager [11]. Docker leverages
several recently-added Linux kernel features, but in the pro-
cess exposed a number of potentially critical flaws in those
kernel services that could compromise the security of the en-
tire operating system. Alternately, we can move kernel ser-
vices to user level, such as with the FUSE file system ab-
straction [14] and Open vSwitch [26]. However, these can
impose a prohibitively high performance penalty [1, 32], ne-
cessitating a kernel caching layer [5] that poses its own set
of tradeoffs. Certain Linux kernel interfaces can be rapidly
reconfigured with eBPF [30] scripts, but only for small lin-
ear snippets of code. The widespread belief that in the fu-
ture, all high performance operations must “bypass the ker-
nel” is an illustration of how operating systems are losing
the race [3, 25, 36].
Our goal is to enable high velocity development for high-
performance, general-purpose operating system kernel exten-
sions. Our trust model is that of a slightly harried kernel de-
veloper, rather than an untrusted application developer. We
want to provide a way for kernel developers to add kernel fea-
tures in a manner that isolates bugs to within the extension
and also allows for dynamic replacement of that function-
ality without the need to restart applications [35]. To be as
widely applicable as possible, we focus on enabling rapid de-
velopment of Linux kernel code, rather than to assume a new
code base designed for extensibility, such as Exokernels [12],
Spin [4], or Barrelfish [35]. To be concrete, we restrict our-
selves, at first, to file system extensibility. We leave dynamic
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replacement of file systems to future work.
Our approach is inspired by the recent availability of type-
safe, non-garbage collected, performant languages like Rust.
Writing kernel extensions in Rust eliminates a class of cross-
module bugs that could compromise kernel security, without
the performance overhead of running at user-level or the re-
strictions on extension behavior imposed by eBPF. However,
supporting compatibilitywith existing operating systems and
features for high development velocity such as dynamicmod-
ule replacement, debugging, and code reuse, is challenging.
For this work, we focus on high velocity kernel file sys-
tems. We have built a framework, called Bento, for inject-
ing general-purpose file systems and file systems extensions,
written in Rust, into Linux. Surprisingly, Linux’s existing
pluggable file system interface, VFS, is poorly suited to our
needs, as it assumes shared data structures can pass freely
across the extension interface, complicating compile-time
type checking. Instead, Bento interposes a thin layer for calls
into the file system, and calls from the file system back
into the kernel, providing safety, high performance, general-
ity, and compatibility with Linux. While our architecture is
designed to be compatible with graceful online upgrades of
running file systems along with support for other features for
high development velocity, we leave that for future work.
We have used Bento to implement the xv6 file system to
run in the Linux kernel. We have additionally implemented
baseline versions, one written in C against the VFS layer
and one (written in Rust) running in userspace using FUSE.
We found that our framework has performance very similar
to, and sometimes better than, the VFS C version while the
FUSE version performed much worse than both.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We design and implement Bento, a framework that en-
ables high-velocity development of safe, performant file
systems in Linux.
• We present techniques for allowing safe Rust code to
run in the Linux kernel and access kernel functionality.
• We implement a file system using Bento and evaluate
its performance characteristics.
2 Background
2.1 Bug Analysis
One of the existing barriers to fast evolution in Linux comes
from buggy code. New code often introduces bugs, disincen-
tivizing fast evolution for mission-critical pieces of code like
operating systems. Kernel code is particularly affected by
this because kernel bugs are often difficult to find and can
have severe non-local consequences. In particular, memory
bugs, such as memory reuse and dangling pointers, can have
Bug Number Effect on Kernel
Use Before Allocate 6 Likely oops
Double Free 4 Undefined
NULL Dereference 5 oops
Use After Free 3 Likely oops
Over Allocation 1 Overutilization
Out of Bounds 4 Likely oops
Dangling Pointer 1 Likely oops
Missing Free 18 Memory Leak
Reference Count Leak 7 Memory Leak
Other Memory 1 Variable
Deadlock 5 Deadlock
Race Condition 5 Variable
Other Concurrency 1 Variable
Unchecked Error Value 5 Variable
Other Type Error 8 Variable
Table 1: Count of analyzed bugs with effects of each bug,
categorized as memory, concurrency, or type.
catastrophic consequences on the reliability of the system,
potentially even leading to security violations.
To understand the properties of bugs in existing Linux ker-
nel extensions, we analyzed bug reports for three extensions
used by Docker: AppArmor for security, Open vSwitch Dat-
apath for networking, and Overlay FS for file system support.
We analyzed all bug-fix git commits from 2014-2018 and cat-
egorized them by the type of bug that was fixed.
Our analysis focused on what we call low-level bugs: bugs
that are unrelated to the specific logic of the extensions.
These bugs can be caught without knowing specific correct-
ness properties needed by the extension. This is opposed
to semantic bugs which are caused by violations of high-
level correctness properties. Low level bugs made up 50%
of the total bugs. We divided the low-level bugs into three
categories: memory bugs, concurrency bugs, and type errors.
Memory bugs refer to incorrect usage of memory, including
NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds errors, and mem-
ory leaks. Concurrency bugs are caused by incorrect concur-
rency patterns, such as deadlocks and race conditions. Type
errors are caused by incorrect usage of kernel types, most of-
ten by interpreting error values as valid data.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. We found
that 68% of these bugs were memory bugs. Of the memory
bugs, 50%were a type of memory leak. Many of the bugs oc-
curred along error handling pathways, often due to incorrect
checking of returned values (unchecked error values) or miss-
ing cleanup (memory leaks, NULL pointer dereferences, etc.).
Based on our analysis of these low-level bugs, 93% would
be prevented by using Rust. The remaining 7% of low-level
bugs were primarily deadlocks.
Many of the bugs could have serious impacts on the in-
tegrity of the system. Of the identified low-level bugs, 26%
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Safety Performance Generality Online Upgrade
VFS ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
FUSE ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
eBPF ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
Bento ✓ ✓ ✓ tbd
Table 2: A comparison of Linux file system extensibility
mechanisms. None of Linux’s existing mechanisms provide
all the desired features.
of the bugs caused a kernel oops which either kills the of-
fending process or panics the kernel. An additional 34% of
the analyzed bugs bugs would result in a memory leak, poten-
tially leading the system to run out of memory and opening
up the system to DoS attacks.
2.2 File System Extensibility Today
Linux has several existing techniques to support rapid evo-
lution of file system functionality. These include the Vir-
tual File System (or VFS) layer built into Linux, FUSE for
userspace file systems, and eBPF for running small portions
of a user space code safely in the kernel. However, none of
these approaches provide all of the properties we need for
high velocity development. A summary is shown in Table 2,
and details are discussed below. Note that compatibility with
existing Linux code is implicit in all of these approaches and
in Bento.
VFS: Linux provides a mechanism for adding new file sys-
tems called the Virtual File System (or VFS) layer. This layer
defines a set of function pointers to be implemented by new
file system modules and calls these functions inside related
system calls. It is used by all major file systems in Linux.
This interface prioritizes generality and performance, al-
lowing file systems maximum flexibility when interacting
with core kernel components. The resulting interface is com-
plex and has few guardrails, making it difficult for develop-
ers to implement new functionality without introducing bugs.
While a new file system can be loaded dynamically, an exist-
ing file system cannot be modified except bymount/unmount
and quiescing application use of the file system. Likewise,
debugging support is limited.
FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace, or FUSE [14], enables
running file system code in userspace, via a small kernel
VFS layer that forwards operations to the userspace imple-
mentation. Thus, FUSE is able to achieve safety and general-
ity, along with the ability to use normal user-level debuggers.
This comes at a cost, however. All file system operations pass
through VFS and the FUSE kernel driver before being pack-
aged up and copied to userspace, reducing performance by
up to 83% [32]. Despite this slowdown, FUSE is frequently
used for prototyping new file systems, especially in circum-
stances where performance is not critical. FUSE does not
provide a mechanism for transparent online modification of
running file systems, although such a system could theoreti-
cally be implemented at user level.
eBPF: Another approach to safe extensibility in Linux is
the eBPF (extended Berkeley Packed Filter) [23], an in-
kernel virtual machine that allows short extensions with lim-
ited control flow and written in a restricted language to be
run at predefined points in the kernel. While the main-line
Linux kernel doesn’t support eBPF for file systems, a project
(ExtFUSE [5]) has provided support for parts of a FUSE file
system to be run in the kernel using eBPF. For kernel code
that can fit within thee eBPF model, this provides safe exten-
sibility without significant performance overhead. However,
the restrictions placed on eBPF extensions make it very diffi-
cult to implement whole file systems or even significant file
system extensions using eBPF. ExtFUSE does not support
dynamic reconfiguration.
3 Goals and Challenges
The goal of Bento is to provide for high-velocity develop-
ment of Linux file systems. To make our design goals con-
crete, consider the OverlayFS extension to Linux used by
Docker. OverlayFS allows for the name space of a file sys-
tem to be layered on top of another, allowing containers to
be configured with a base file system plus changes. Or con-
sider improving the support for non-volatile memory (NVM)
to Linux. Systems such as Strata [17] have shown that pre-
pending an operation log stored in NVM can dramatically
improve write performance while reducing vulnerability to
application-level bugs. These operation logs can be repli-
cated for high availability [2].
Finally, consider what would be needed to add data prove-
nance to Linux - the ability to track all of the data sources and
executable images that could have affected a particular out-
put file [31]. If a data source becomes invalid (e.g., because
of a change to sensor calibration), provenance can be used to
track down what derived data needs to be regenerated. Fur-
ther, old versions of data files may need to be retained (and
later garbage collected) if they are part of the provenance of
live output files.
In all three cases, the functionality needs to work with ex-
isting, unmodified Linux binaries, has complex internal logic
and data structures, is performance-sensitive, benefits from
ongoing development, and to be deployable, must not com-
promise the security of the rest of the operating system. We
assume the developer is well-intentioned but a bit clumsy - it
is not our intent to preventmalicious insider attacks for newly
developed code.
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Thus, our frameworkmust support several, seemingly con-
flicting, goals:
• Safety:Any bugs in a newly installed file system should
be limited, as much as possible, to applications or con-
tainers that use that file system. These bugs should be
kept to a minimum.
• Performance: Performance should be similar to that
achievable by the same functionality implemented di-
rectly in the kernel.
• Generality: There is a large variety of file system de-
signs that developers might want to implement. The
framework should not limit the types of file systems that
can be developed.
• Compatibility: New functionality should be deploy-
able to existing, unmodified Linux binaries without re-
compiling or relinking, and without substantial changes
to Linux’s internal architecture.
• Development velocity: The framework should support
dynamic upgrades to running file system code, transpar-
ently to applications, except for a small delay. Further,
code should be easily migratable between user level and
the kernel, to enable use of modern debugging and soft-
ware analysis tools. This last goal is supported architec-
turally by our approach, but experimental demonstration
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our high level approach for Bento is to enable writing file
systems in a safe, non-garbage collected language, specifi-
cally Rust. This is able to provide the first three goals detailed
above. Rust’s strict type system is able to provide safety,
eliminating certain classes of bugs such as NULL pointer def-
erences or use-after-free bugs. Since Rust is compiled like C
and does not use garbage collection, it has performance simi-
lar to C and does not suffer from performance unpredictabil-
ity caused by garbage collectors. Rust is a general purpose
programming language and provides the necessary general-
ity to enabling writing a wide variety of file systems.
To realize this approach, we need to address several chal-
lenges. Compatibility with existing operating systems and
online upgrades, the other two goals for this work, are not in-
herently provided by writing file systems in Rust. Bento must
provide additional support in order to achieve these proper-
ties. However, challenges arise when trying to provide that
support.
3.1 Compatibility Challenges
In order for a Rust file system to execute in the Linux ker-
nel, there must be a way for the Rust file system to inter-
act with the C kernel. A naive approach is just compiling
the Rust file systems into a binary format and load it into
the kernel. Rust is designed to interface with code written in
other languages, particularly C, easily using its Foreign Func-
tion Interface. Rust code can call functions written in C and
vice versa, and Rust data structures can be tagged so they
use C-style memory layout. In fact, without considering any
other factors, running Rust code in the Linux kernel is fairly
straightforward.
However, this naive approach does not maintain the safety
of the Rust file systems. Rust code that calls external func-
tions or dereferences raw pointers must be tagged as unsafe.
Rust’s type system is not able to provide the same guarantees
about unsafe code, e.g. NULL pointer dereferences and out-of-
bounds accesses are possible, so unsafe code cannot provide
the safety we require for Bento. Simple techniques for intro-
ducing safety, such as wrapping C functions in safe wrappers
or replacing pointers with references, are not enough to fully
provide safety due to fundamental challenges caused by ker-
nel design patterns, which we now describe. We assume that
the kernel is correct.
3.1.1 Challenge 1: Memory Management
One challenge is caused by memory management for data
structures passed across the boundary between the file sys-
tem and the kernel. Rust is able to provide memory safety
and automatic memory management by doing compile-time
tracking of data structures. However, the VFS interface re-
quires that some data structures created by the file system be
passed across the kernel/file system boundary and back again.
Since the Rust compiler is not able to analyze the code out-
side the file system, it is not able to verify the safety of tak-
ing ownership of data structures from the kernel. Therefore,
the VFS file system interface cannot be implemented in safe
Rust.
3.1.2 Challenge 2: Accessing Kernel Services
Another challenge stems from the file system’s need to ac-
cess services provided by the kernel. However, the interfaces
exposed by kernel services are not designed for Rust’s safety
guarantees, so kernel services cannot necessarily be exposed
safely to Rust file systems without modifications. To allow
the file system to use kernel services safely, Bento must trans-
late the unsafe kernel-provided interfaces into interfaces that
can be used by the file systems safely.
3.2 Online Upgrades Challenges
Online upgrades, updating a file system without bringing it
offline, also is not provided by writing the file systems in a
safe language. In Linux today, file system module upgrades
is done by shutting down all services relying on the file sys-
tem, unmounting the file system, removing the module, in-
serting the new module, mounting the new file system, and
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then restarting all services. In order to support online up-
grades, additional functionality must be added to enable up-
dating to a new version of the file system without requiring
the file system or services running on top of it to be shut
down. Trying to implement that functionality in Linux gives
rise to the following challenges.
3.2.1 Challenge 3: Shared Data Structure Lifetime
The memory management pattern described in §3.1.1, where
data structures created by the file system are passed to the ker-
nel, also introduces challenges for online upgrades. Since the
kernel holds data structures backed by file system memory,
and the file system has no way to control when that memory
should be reclaimed. If the file system were updated when
there were outstanding data structures held by the kernel,
those kernel pointers would become invalid. To avoid this
case, the file system must wait for the kernel to have com-
pleted all operations on the file system and have returned all
shared-ownership data structures to the file system. There is
no guarantee of this happening until the file system is un-
mounted, so upgrades cannot be done online.
3.2.2 Challenge 4: Tracking In-Use Structures
Another challenge is caused by the need to track data struc-
tures that the file system is currently using, both data struc-
tures from kernel services and in-memory data used by the
file system. For example, a running file system will execute
block I/O or possibly network operations and may be using
kernel data structures for those operations when the upgrade
occurs. The file system could also have internal, in-memory
state such as which blocks need to be written to a commit
log or a cache of on-disk data structures. If the file system
updates without transferring any of its in-use data structures,
potentially bad behavior can occur. In the best case, caches
of on-disk data structures need to be rebuilt, and performance
temporarily suffers. In the worst case, correctness conditions
could be violated if the file system requires long-lived state.
Since the existing techniques for upgrades in Linux assume
that the file system will be completely shut down during the
upgrade, there are no mechanisms to transfer data structures.
3.3 Debugging Challenges
The ability to quickly and effectively debug code is critical
for fast development in practice. Kernel code is notoriously
difficult to debug because of the often non-local effects of
kernel bugs and the potential for a buggy operating system
to interfere with the process of debugging. In order to enable
effective debugging, we propose allowing file systems writ-
ten using Bento to be run in userspace without requiring code
modifications.
3.3.1 Challenge 5: Debugging API Design
To support running the same code in the kernel and in
userspace, we must provide an API that can be implemented
in both. All APIs, both for Bento to call file system functions
and for the file system to access necessary services, must be
the same in both the kernel and userspace. Providing compat-
ibility with Linux will not necessarily provide this because
the interfaces provided by kernel services may not be com-
patible with the system call interface.
3.4 Code Reuse Challenges
The ability to reuse code is also important for development
velocity. This is particularly relevant for file systems because
there are many circumstances when a user would want to
modify the behavior of an underlying file system, such as
enabling encryption or tracking data provenance. In Linux
today, developers can implement these types of file systems
by stacking layers of file systems (e.g., the ecryptfs file sys-
tem can be layered on top of another file system to add en-
cryption). The higher layer file systems call top-level VFS
functions to access the lower file systems as if the relevant
system call had been executed. This support for stackable,
or composable, file systems allows developers to provide ser-
vices as file system modules that can be used with any exist-
ing file system.
3.4.1 Challenge 6: Composable File System Support
Linux’s existing model for composable file systems can be
supported by exposing the top-level VFS functions to Bento
file systems. However, it is not clear that this is the best so-
lution. Calling top-level VFS functions can add overhead to
each call to a lower file system, resulting in potentially large
overhead if several file systems are layered on top of one an-
other. Bento may be able to provide a different interface for
supporting composable file systems that does not introduce
this overhead but still provides the necessary flexibility.
4 Bento
4.1 System Overview
The design of Bento is shown in Figure 1. Shaded portions
are the framework. The framework runs as a thin layer that
sits between the unmodified Linux kernel and kernel-level
file systems designed for our framework. The Linux kernel
is unmodified other than the introduction of Bento. Like the
VFS layer, Bento defines a set of function calls that file sys-
tems must implement and provides a mechanism for file sys-
tems to register themselves with the framework by providing
the necessary function pointers. Unlike the VFS layer, Bento
is designed to support file systems written in Rust, a type-safe
language that providesmemory safety and data race freedom.
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Challenge Solution Problem Description Detailed Solution
Unsafe Shared Memory Management Restricted Memory Sharing §3.1.1, §3.2.1 §4.3
Unsafe Kernel Interfaces Safe Abstractions Around Kernel Services §3.1.2 §4.5
Transferring Objects During Upgrade Online Upgrade Component §3.2.2 §4.8
Table 3: Summary of Challenges and the Associated Solutions
VFS
BentoFS
File System
BentoKS
Kernel Services
① File Operations API
② Kernel Services API
(a) Kernel Bento
Posix
BentoFS-User
File System
BentoKS-User
clib
(b) Userspace
Bento for Debug-
ging
Figure 1: The design of Bento
Table 3 shows a summary of the challenges and solutions
in Bento. Bento currently consists of two components. One
component of the framework interposes between the VFS
calls and the file system, handling calls into the file system.
This component provides the file operations API, translating
from the VFS interface. The other component interposes be-
low the file system, handling calls out of the file system into
the kernel. This component provides wrappers around kernel
data structures and functions, allowing the Rust file system to
safely access relevant kernel functionality. For file systems,
this primarily handles block I/O.
4.2 Usage
To write a file system using Bento, developers write a safe
Rust kernel module using the provided APIs and insert that
module into their running Linux kernel like any other kernel
module. File system functions are exposed to the operating
system by implementing the file operations API and provid-
ing those function pointers to Bento when the file system is
inserted. When file system functions need to access kernel
functionality, they can do so by calling the safe Rust func-
tions provided by the kernel services API.
4.3 BentoFS & File System Operations API
The VFS layer and the patterns it introduces cause fundamen-
tal challenges to safety when handling memory management
of shared data structures, in particular inodes. Inodes are allo-
cated and destroyed using functions implemented in the file
system and called by the kernel. When the kernel needs a
new inode, it requests one from the file system which allo-
cates the inode using its own memory pool. When the ker-
nel is finished with the inode, it returns the inode to the file
system so the memory can be reclaimed. Giving ownership
from Rust to C can be implemented in Rust by leaking the
memory behind the data structure; this is safe because leak-
ing memory does not violate Rust’s memory safety, but is
not ideal. Taking ownership from C to Rust cannot be im-
plemented safely. Rust must trust that the data structure will
not be used anymore and was originally allocated by Rust.
Since these properties cannot be validated by the Rust com-
piler, this is inherently unsafe.
In order to enable safe file systems, Bento must provide a
different interface than the VFS layer for file system opera-
tions. Calls from the VFS layer are intercepted by BentoFS
and translated into this new interface, shown in Figure 1 at①.
This interface calls from BentoFS to the file system, so the
interface must be designed so it can be implemented safely.
To support this, we define a model that our interface must
follow.
4.4 Ownership model
Our interface follows what we call an “ownership model”,
borrowing the terminology from Rust. In this model, own-
ership of an object can never be passed across the interface,
but objects can be “borrowed”. For each object, one side of
the interface is responsible for both the lifetime management
(tracking when the object is no longer needed) and memory
management. To share an object, the caller passes a reference
to the object to the callee. This does not pass ownership (the
callee has no control over the underlying memory) but does
allow the callee to access the object. This is analogous to a
borrow in Rust and similarly can bemutable or immutable, al-
lowing modification of the object or not, respectively. To the
file system developer, this is just writing typical Rust code.
This model implies a contract between the caller and the
callee. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the object is
not freed while it has been borrowed, that the object is valid,
and that only one mutable borrow exists at one time. The
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callee is responsible for only accessing an object during the
borrow window, accessing objects correctly (i.e., no pointer
arithmetic), and only mutating objects during a mutable bor-
row.
In this case, the callee is the file system, written in Rust.
All of the callee’s responsibilities are checked by the Rust
compiled when using safe Rust, so the file system is guaran-
teed to uphold the model. Our framework is the caller and
must be carefully designed to fulfill its side of the contract.
This ownership model can be viewed as a relaxed version
of what is needed across address space boundaries where no
memory can be shared. This observation led us to leverage
the FUSE kernel module and the FUSE low-level API when
developing BentoFS and the file operations API. The file op-
erations API is a Rust version of FUSE low-level API aug-
mented with a reference to the super_block data structure
needed for file system block operations.
This model should not introduce significant performance
overhead. This loan/borrowmodel is only used to check com-
pile time properties, so does not add performance overhead
at runtime. The performance impact of the interface change
is more difficult to predict, but should still be low. The design
interface does not increase the functionality needed to imple-
ment a file system, it just splits the behavior implemented by
a VFS file system between BentoFS and the file system.
4.5 BentoKS & Kernel Services API
File systems need access to kernel functionality implemented
outside the file system, such as block I/O for access to the
underlying storage device. These kernel interfaces, like those
in the VFS layer, are not designed to abide by type-safety
properties and so cannot be directly used in the file system.
In order to enable use of necessary kernel services, BentoKS
provides safe abstractions around kernel data structures and
functions.
As an example, we will focus on the kernel block I/O func-
tions. File systems in Linux access block devices using the
buffer cache. In this API, a file system that needs to read or
write to a block device calls sb_bread, passing in a pointer
to the super_block data structure and a block number. This
function returns a buffer_head data structure representing
the requested block. The block’s data is represented as a
pointer and size in the buffer_head and the file system can
read and/or write to this memory region. When the file sys-
tem is done using the buffer_head, it must call brelse or
buffers can be leaked.
The widespread use of pointers and pointer manipulation
in the Linux kernel make this challenging. Safe Rust disal-
lows dereferencing raw pointers because the compiler cannot
check the validity of the memory being pointed to. Rust in-
stead relies on typed references that cannot be offset, cast to
nonequivalent types, or NULL safely. However, many kernel
interfaces rely on pointers, so these interfaces cannot be used
by the file system safely.
4.6 Capability Model
In order to access kernel functionality, the file system must
be able to use kernel data structures, both for calling kernel
functions and for making use of objects provided to the file
system by the file operations API described above. The ker-
nel operates on pointers, but directly exposing these pointers
to the file system results in safety errors. If the block I/O
functions exposed to the file system accept a pointer to the
superblock, no guarantees can be made about the memory
layout underlying that pointer.
We use a capability-based model to safely expose ker-
nel pointers to the file system where pointers are replaced
by capability-style types defined in Bento. These types give
the file system the right to access to the fields of the data
structure and to call functions that are exposed by that type.
Creation of these capability-types is limited; they cannot be
safely cast from other types, and initialization is predefined
and sometimes entirely disallowed. Bento converts between
the capability type and the analogous kernel type. For exam-
ple, the file system often receives the SuperBlock capabil-
ity type from the file operations API to represent the kernel
super_block data structure. It can use the SuperBlock ca-
pability type to read fields of the kernel super_block and
call kernel functions like sb_bread for block I/O that require
a kernel super_block. The SuperBlock type cannot be cre-
ated by the file system, so having this type is proof that the
file system has access to a valid kernel super_block. Bento
can then safely convert the capability type to a pointer and
directly access kernel functions.
The capability types are compile-time wrappers around
pointers so the Rust compiler can enforce correctness prop-
erties at compile time. It is assumed that the kernel passes in
valid pointers, so no properties need to be checked at runtime
and no runtime overhead is added.
4.7 Wrapping Abstractions
Bento must also provide wrapping abstractions around ker-
nel services so they can be used safely by the file system.
To enable file systems written in safe Rust, Bento must pro-
vide safe abstractions wrapping kernel services. These ab-
stractions can be used by the file system like any other Rust
data structures and functions.
To be concrete, we address the example discussed
above. We provide a safe abstraction to wrap the kernel
buffer_head. We implement a method on the BufferHead
wrapper to convert the separate pointer and size fields for the
contained memory region into a sized memory region that
can be used safely. That method must use unsafe code to
make a sized memory region out of the unsized pointer and
size fields, but the file system can call the method safely. To
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prevent accidental memory leaks, we call the brelse func-
tion in the drop method of the BufferHead wrapper, which
is called when the wrapper goes out of scope. With this,
buffer management has the same properties as memory man-
agement in Rust: memory leaks are possible but difficult.
These abstractions can, in some cases, add a small amount
of performance overhead. If a kernel function has require-
ments on its arguments, the wrapping method will most
likely need to perform a runtime check to ensure that the
requirements are held. This overhead should be small since
checks are not performed often and are simple.
4.8 Online Upgrades API
In order to enable online upgrades, Bento will provide a me-
diating layer that maintains any state that needs to be pre-
served through the upgrade, such as long-lived kernel data
structures like a network connection for a networked file sys-
tem or internal file system state like an in-memory cache of
on-disk data structures. Bento is already a runtime in the ker-
nel, so it can easily be extended to include the necessary func-
tionality.
This component will need to have a data structure transfer
mechanism so important data structures can be passed from
the old version of the file system to the new version during
the upgrade. Kernel data structures can already be tracked
by Bento through the kernel services API, and functionality
can be added to support transferring these data structures.
To transfer file system internal data structures, the online
upgrade component will extend Bento’s interface with new
functions for storing in-memory state and initializing from
that provided state. When the old version of the file system
is about to be stopped, the online upgrade component will
call the file system’s provided function. This function will
perform any necessary shutdown, such as flushing state, and
will return in-memory state that should be transferred. This
state will then be passed to the new version of the file system
when it starts up so it can restore the necessary in-memory
state.
4.9 Userspace Debugging
To support easy debugging, Bento will enable developers to
run the same code in userspace and in the kernel and so use
userspace debuggers. To enable this, Bento will provide alter-
nate implementations of the BentoFS and BentoKS compo-
nents that interface with userlevel interfaces, specifically the
POSIX API instead of VFS and C library functions instead
of kernel services. Since the interfaces exposed by the kernel
and by userspace libraries are different, it is not obvious that
the APIs written for the kernelwill be able to be implemented
without modification. We will analyze and implement this as
part of our future work.
5 Implementation
Bento is built in Linux kernel version 4.15. It is implemented
as a Linux kernel module in 1409 lines of Rust code for Ben-
toKS and 7409 lines of C code for BentoFS.
5.1 Kernel-Mode Rust
Writing a kernel module in Rust is different than writing
userspace Rust code. The basic structure of our kernel mod-
ule is borrowed from tsgates/rust.ko on Github. The kernel
module is compiled as a static library which is then linked
with any required C code to generate the kernel module (a
.ko file). This kernel module can then be inserted into the
kernel as normal by any sudo user. Kernel code in Rust, like
all kernel code, cannot use the standard library, but the Rust
core library can still be used. We found that we had to ad-
ditionally limit the Rust implementation to code that can’t
cause a panic.
The Rust portions of the Bento kernel module must inter-
face with C code. Rust data structures can be tagged with
#[repr(C)] to force the memory layout to match the C lay-
out of the same structure, allowing the data structure to be
passed across the language boundary. Rust functions can be
called fromC as long as they are taggedwith #[no_mangle],
preventing the Rust compiler from mangling the name of
the function. Rust’s FFI (Foregin Function Interface) enables
Rust code to seamlessly call functions implemented in C.
The Rust code only needs to define the function interface
in an extern block and the functions will be linked at com-
pile time. The Rust bindgen tool can be used to automatically
generate these bindings from C header files.
5.2 VFS Interposition
One of the primary jobs of Bento is to interpose between the
VFS layer and the file system. As part of this translation, the
file operations component of Bento must handle the interac-
tions with core kernel data structures that are expected of a
file system written against the VFS layer.
We use the FUSE kernel module and the FUSE low-level
interface as starting points for BentoFS and the file opera-
tions API. The FUSE kernel module must implement much
of the same functionality as BentoFS, so we use a modified
version of it to implement BentoFS.
Unlike in FUSE, the file operations layer and the file sys-
tem reside in the same address space and trust domain. Bento
can therefore communicate with the file system using func-
tion calls. Our framework implements this like the VFS layer;
function pointers to file system operations are stored in a data
structure that is provided to Bento when the file system is
mounted and upgraded.
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5.3 Implementing Safe Wrappers
The Rust capability types are implemented as a Rust type
with one field: a pointer to the relevant kernel type. This en-
ables BentoFS to pass a pointer to the kernel data structure to
the file system functions with no overhead. BentoKS imple-
ments methods of these capability types that the file system
can use to safely access kernel functionality. These functions
can be called from the Rust file system on the capability type
data structures even though these were originally allocated
as C data structures.
6 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of Bento to determine what,
if any, overheads exist to using it. For this, we have imple-
mented the file system from the xv6 teaching operating sys-
tem and two variants: one written in C, running in the ker-
nel using the VFS layer and one written in Rust, running in
userspace using FUSE. By comparing against the VFS layer,
we can determine the overhead Bento introduces. By com-
paring against FUSE, we can quantify the benefits of Bento
relative to a purely userlevel file system.
Since xv6 is a toy operating system, it is missing opti-
mizations that a commercial-grade optimizationswould have.
This can heavily impact the FUSE baseline because the un-
optimized operations may be particularly expensive from
userspace. The VFS baseline is also less optimized than
Bento because Bento inherits optimizations from the FUSE
kernel module while the VFS baseline was just written for
this evaluation. Therefore, the xv6 evaluation could be some-
what unfairly optimistic to Bento when compared to the same
evaluation on a commercial-grade file system. We therefore
also compare against ext4 on the macrobenchmarks. Ext4 is
more optimized than the xv6 file system, but the performance
results can still be compared to understand ballpark perfor-
mance differences. Relatively small differences can indicate
that our results may be similar to those we would achieve
on a commercial-grade file system. We mount ext4 with the
data=journal option so it logs file data in the journal like
the xv6 file system.
6.1 Xv6 File System Changes
In order to write the xv6 file system in Rust and run the
benchmarks, some changes needed to be made to the file sys-
tem design. In all versions of the file system, we needed to
add locks around inode and block number allocations due to
race conditions on the block device. We also added double
indirect blocks to all three versions of the file system so files
up to 4GB could be created. In general, the Rust versions
include more locks than the C version and official xv6 repos-
itory [34], specifically on global mutable variables that are
only modified during initialization. Otherwise, the Rust file
systems are nearly identical to the C file systems.
6.2 Baseline Implementations
As a baseline, we implement a VFS file system written in
C. It is implemented in 1862 lines of C code. This filesys-
tem is as close to our framework’s version as possible to en-
able accurate comparison between the two approaches. This
baseline allows us to analyze any overhead that Bento may
introduce over the VFS layer.
The other baseline is a userlevel version using FUSE. This
is 1744 lines of Rust and uses a Rust reimplementation of
the FUSE userspace library [15] with minor changes such
as enabling the writeback cache. The code for this version
is nearly identical to the code written using our framework.
Minor changes to the code are needed to swap out kernel
services for Rust user-level services, such as using the Rust
standard library mutex instead of the kernel semaphore. Ad-
ditionally, block I/O from userspace is done by opening the
Linux disk file using the O_DIRECT flag. We note future work
will be able to run the same code in Bento and at userlevel.
6.3 Test Setup
The benchmarks were run on a machine with 8 × Intel Core
i7 CPU, 31 GiB DDR4 RAM, and a 512GB Samsung PM981
NVMe SSD. All benchmarks were run using the SSD as
the backing device. Due to the present health concerns, the
benchmarks were run through a virtual machine using PCIe
passthrough to access the SSD.
6.4 Benchmarks
From filebench, we run the single-threaded and 32-threaded
read, write, file creation and file deletion microbenchmarks
and the varmail and fileserver macrobenchmarks. To this, we
also measure untaring the Linux kernel. These benchmarks
were run on an NVME SSD and executed for one minute
in all cases. The varmail macrobenchmark simulates a mail
server. It repeatedly generates file creates, file deletes, file
reads and writes, and appends to an operation log, syncing
after writing. The fileserver macrobenchmark simulates a file
serving application.
We see significant slowdown because of slow block I/O
from userspace, even through the O_DIRECT file interface.
Each block operation from userspace must pass across the
user/kernel boundary and through the VFS layer before
reaching the disk, adding 200-400ns to each operation. On
top of that, the file interface imposes additional overheads.
The file system must occasionally sync blocks to disk (such
as during log operations), but the file interface provides no
way to sync parts of a file, so the whole disk file must be
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synced every time one block needs to be synced, making
fsyncs very costly.
6.5 Microbenchmarks
6.5.1 Read
The performance results for the read microbenchmarks are
shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. All figures include single-
threaded and 32-threaded benchmarks for both sequential
read and random read. Figure 2 shows performance for 4KB
reads in operations per second. The other graphs show perfor-
mance for 32KB, 128KB, and 1024 KB reads in throughput,
measured in MBps.
All three versions of the file system show very similar per-
formance results for all sizes of reads for both random and
sequential reads. The similarity in performance is due to in-
kernel caching and the small size of the file. All three ver-
sions of the file system use the same technique for caching
read requests, implemented in the file system in the C-kernel
version, in the file operations layer in Bento, and in FUSE
kernel module for the FUSE version. Since the file is small
and read requests are fast, the file is cached very quickly. Af-
ter this, all requests hit the same in-kernel cache, and all ver-
sions execute the exact same code. The xv6 file system can-
not support files larger than 4GB, so we cannot run a bench-
mark that evaluates the differences.
6.5.2 Write
The performance results for the write microbenchmarks are
shown in Figure 4. The graphs include single-threaded se-
quential writes and single-threaded and 32-threaded random
writes for 32KB, 128KB and 1024KB writes. Our evaluation
1 Thread 32 Threads
Bento 1126 1072
C-Kernel 933 881
FUSE 24 24
Table 4: Create Microbenchmark Performance (Ops/sec)
does not include 4KB writes because these often triggered a
segmentation fault in Filebench. Performance is measured in
throughput in MBps. The performance of the FUSE file sys-
tem was so low, these bars are nearly flush with the bottom
of the graphs.
The Bento file system shows similar performance to the
C version of the file system, and both perform much better
than the FUSE version of the file system. The versions writ-
ten in Rust using Bento and in C in the kernel implement
nearly identical behavior, so it is expected for them to have
similar performance. The Bento file system performs some-
what better than the VFS file system on large writes because
Bento, which inherits from the FUSE kernel module, uses a
more optimized technique for writing pages. Bento uses the
writepagesmethod instead of writepage, allowing sequen-
tial pages to be batched.
We see significant slowdown because of slow block I/O
from userspace, even through the O_DIRECT file interface.
Each block operation from userspace must pass across the
user/kernel boundary and through the VFS layer before
reaching the disk, adding 200-400ns to each operation. On
top of that, the file interface imposes additional overheads.
The file system must occasionally sync blocks to disk (such
as during log operations), but the file interface provides no
way to sync parts of a file, so the whole disk file must be
synced every time one block needs to be synced, making
fsyncs very costly.
6.5.3 Create
Performance for the file creation microbenchmarkon an SSD
is shown in Table 4 for both single threaded and 32-threaded
creates. In these benchmarks, Bento shows competitive per-
formance to the C version in the kernel and much better
performance than the FUSE version. File creation involves
many small writes (and so syncs in the log), so the FUSE
performance is heavily impacted by slow syncs. FUSE shows
less slowdown for creates than it does for writes. This occurs
because the create microbenchmarks spend a smaller percent-
age of the time executing slow disk operations.
6.5.4 Delete
Performance results for the file deletion microbenchmark on
an SSD are shown in Table 5 for both single-threaded and 32-
threaded benchmarks. These results show similar trends as
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1 Thread 32 Threads
Bento 7499 7502
C-Kernel 7500 8253
FUSE 118 116
Table 5: Delete Microbenchmark Performance (Ops/sec)
Varmail (ops/s) Fileserver (ops/s) Untar (s)
Bento 320 3860 19.8
C-Kernel 303 2947 31.6
FUSE 24 7 3404.9
Ext4 785 5172 6.2
Table 6: Macrobenchmark Performance
the file creation microbenchmarks because both are metadata
heavy benchmarks so generate many small writes.
6.6 Macrobenchmarks
6.6.1 Varmail
Performance results for the varmail macrobenchmark on an
SSD are shown in Table 6. The file system implemented us-
ing Bento and the C version in the kernel have very similar
performance while the FUSE version shows much worse per-
formance. Since this is a metadata-heavy macrobenchmark,
the xv6 file system results are similar to the metadata-heavy
microbenchmarks (file creation and deletion). The FUSE ver-
sion performs comparatively better on the varmal benchmark
than it does on the other benchmarks because varmail exe-
cutes fsyncs on files. While fsyncs are slower for the FUSE
version than they are for the other two xv6 file systems, the
slowdown is not as large when whole files are being synced
instead of individual blocks. On all three versions of the xv6
file system, the fsyncs take up the majority of the runtime,
so the performance properties of the fsyncs are reflected in
the overall performance numbers. For this benchmark, ext4
performs about 2.5x faster than either of the in-kernel xv6
implementations.
6.6.2 Fileserver
Performance results for the fileserver benchmark on the SSD
are shown in Table 6. This benchmark involves many reads,
writes, and file creates and deletes. Like the other bench-
marks, these results show that the file system implemented
using Bento and the version using the VFS layer in the ker-
nel have very similar performance, and both outperform the
FUSE version. This benchmark is particularly affected by the
FUSE slowdowns because it involves many writes and cre-
ates, both of which introduce significant overhead. Ext4 only
performs only 33% better than the xv6 file system written us-
ing Bento. At that point, ext4 appears to be bounded by the
throughput of the SSD.
6.6.3 Untar Linux
This benchmark (shown in Table 6) untars the Linux kernel
onto the relevant file system, generating many file creations
and writes across many directories. Unlike the other bench-
marks, this measures total execution time instead of opera-
tions per second, so lower is better. This benchmark shows
somewhat more performance difference between the Bento
file system and the VFS file system. This is likely caused
by the same difference seen in the write microbenchmarks:
Bento is able to batch sequential writes while the VFS imple-
mentation of xv6 is not.
6.7 Future Evaluation
As future work, we will demonstrate development velocity
by implementing and evaluating real-world file systems us-
ing Bento. The simplicity of the xv6 file system was ideal
for the proof-of-concept work, but a more full-featured file
system will better demonstrate the velocity, generality, and
low performance impact of Bento. We plan to focus on a re-
search file system that shows promise for practical use, both
proving that Bento can support a more complicated file sys-
tem and providing a high-performance implementation of a
file system that has demand in the community.
7 Related Work
7.1 FUSE
FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) [14] is a framework that en-
ables implementing a file system to run in userspace. The
FUSE framework consists of two pieces, a kernel driver that
translates VFS calls to FUSE-internal requests that are sent
to userspace and libFUSE, a userspace library that interfaces
with the user file system. Like Bento, FUSE targets safety
and ease-of-development for Linux file systems. It’s able
to provide these properties quite well by running code in
userspace and providing a simplified interface. However, run-
ning the file system in userspace introduces extra kernel
crossings, leading to up to 83% overhead. This overhead
is too severe for many applications, and production systems
rarely employ FUSE. Bento takes advantage of the interface
work done in FUSE, using the FUSE low-level interface and
a modified version of the FUSE kernel driver.
7.2 eBPF
The extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) [23] is another
technique for safe extensibility in Linux. It allows users to
insert limited pieces of code to run in the Linux kernel at
a set of predefined locations with restricted permissions. As
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implied by the name, eBPF was originally aimed at network
packet processing, but has since been expanded to support
broader functionality. While the mainline eBPF code has no
support for file systems, a project [5] has enabled writing
parts of a stackable file system using eBPF. Broadly, eBPF
provides a high level of safety and good performance but
can’t easily support the large modules with complex logic
and data structures that Bento targets. eBPF programs are
limited in size and type of operations. While eBPF pro-
grams can be chained together with tail calls, maintaining
state across the tail calls is complicated at best.
7.3 Verification
Over the last few years, several papers have been published
on verified operating systems and file systems [7, 24, 29].
These projects use formal verification to ensure that an im-
plementation of a system abides by some defined correct-
ness properties. By enforcing proofs of correctness proper-
ties, this technique is able to eliminate many bugs without
necessarily adding performance overhead. However, verified
file systems are still difficult to design and implement, requir-
ing specialized knowledge. Additionally, there are currently
no practical mechanisms to verifying concurrent code.
7.4 Software Fault Isolation
Software fault isolation is a technique for limiting the im-
pact of faults in a module and has seen several implementa-
tions [6, 33], including one for Linux modules [20]. Using
this technique, faults in a protected module are unable to im-
pact the correctness of surrounding code. SFI can have sig-
nificant performance overhead in many cases, ranging any-
where from 0× to 4× CPU overhead. This overhead man-
ifests both while executing the isolated. module and while
transitioning into and out of the module. Additionally, while
SFI can address some of the safety concerns when develop-
ing Linux modules, it does not reduce the number of bugs in
the module, only ensuring that bugs in the module will be
isolated to the module.
7.5 High-level Languages
Other projects have also employed a high-level language
with a strict type system to provide safety in the operat-
ing system. Like Bento, the SPIN operating system [4] pro-
vides safe extensibility by combining a safe, modular inter-
face with modules implemented in a safe language, though
SPIN designed the whole operating system around extensi-
bility. Bento applies these techniques and the associated ben-
efits to Linux. Other operating systems projects, such as Sin-
gularity [16], Biscuit [9], and Redox [27], explore writing
the entire operating system in a high-level language. Addi-
tionally, we’re not the first group to integrate Rust code into
the Linux kernel. Other projects have implemented device
drivers in Rust [18, 19].
8 Future Work
The work we have done on Bento so far is the beginning of
a larger project. Over the next year, we plan to further work
both on Bento for file systems and for other interfaces across
the Linux kernel. Over the next six months, we plan to con-
clude our work on the file system extensibility layer and sub-
mit a paper on the topic. After that, we intend to apply the
concepts in this paper to other interfaces across the Linux
kernel, starting with networking.
8.1 Fully Supporting File Systems
On top of addressing the remaining challenges and imple-
menting future work discussed thus far (online upgrades,
debugging API, composable file systems, real-world evalu-
ation), we will update to more recent kernel versions to take
advantage of new functionality. Recent versions of the Linux
kernel have included a new abstraction for performing asyn-
chronous I/O from userspace called io_uring. Using this
interface for the I/O accesses from the FUSE version of the
xv6 file system in the evaluation could result in better perfor-
mance numbers, potentially decreasing the overhead seen by
using FUSE. More interestingly, our framework could hook
into the file I/O part of io_uring along with the VFS layer,
allowing users to entirely bypass the VFS layer. We cannot
currently use io_uring because our framework is built in
Linux kernel version 4.15 and io_uring requires version
5.1. Updating to the new kernel version and incorporating
io_uring is part of our future work on this project.
8.2 Beyond File Systems
While this project focuses on file systems, none of the goals,
challenges, or techniques are unique to file systems; other
types of extensions can also benefit from this design. We
plan to first focus on networking, particularly the TCP/IP
functionality (or more broadly, OSI layers 3 and 4). Recent
work has shown demand for specialized, userspace network
stacks [21, 22] to improve performance for specific applica-
tions. Similarly, exokernel operating systems [12] and kernel-
bypass networking [25] seek to improve performance by us-
ing optimized network stacks and/or avoiding the overhead
of the Linux kernel network stack. However, kernel bypass
networking has downsides, requiring the whole NIC to be
given to the userspace process and burning CPU cores for
polling. Applying the concepts from this projects to kernel
networking could enable running specialized network stacks
in the kernel, enabling the performance gains of running a
specialized network stack without the downsides of kernel
bypass networking.
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In the long term, we intend to apply the concepts from this
project to interfaces across the Linux kernel. Many interfaces
could benefit from improved safety and increased develop-
ment velocity. Past work has used Rust to write drivers [18],
but these drivers still have a significant amount of unsafe
code. Other pieces of the kernel, such as scheduling algo-
rithms or security modules, could be targets for future work.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we present Bento, a framework to improve de-
velopment velocity in operating systems, focusing on Linux
kernel file systems for this work. We’ve identified several
properties an extensibility framework must provide for high
development velocity: safety, performance, generality, com-
patibility with existing operating systems, and other fea-
tures for fast development velocity such as online upgrades
and code reuse. By taking advantage of Rust, a modern
type-safe, non-garbage-collected language, and enforcing re-
stricted memory sharing between the file system and the ker-
nel, safe abstractions around kernel services, and isolated file
system modules, Bento is able to provide the first four of
these properties for Linux kernel file systems, with the fifth
coming soon. We’ve implemented the xv6 file system using
Bento and shown that it has similar performance to a VFS
kernel file system using the same design. As future work,
we’ll continue development on Bento, adding more features
such as support for online upgrades, and we’ll use Bento
to implement more full-featured file systems. Code will be
available once this additional work has been completed.
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